



# **REPORT OF THE UN STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT OF CARANA**



**10 July 2015**

## **Executive Summary**

- The conflict in Carana has reached a stalemate in which the government can no longer control significant portions of the country and militias and other non-state actors have stepped in to fill the vacuum. In the west an alternative structure is evolving in areas controlled by the MPC while the south is increasingly fragmented, lacking any structure and reverting to control by individual local leaders under the general banner of the CISC. No single entity is capable of achieving a successful military outcome to the conflict, resources are tight, and ethnic tensions have been increasingly evident with atrocities being committed in a number of areas.
- The worst-case scenario would see the stalemate that exists now sliding into a state of general anarchy, or see a de facto breakup of the country under individual factions; while the latter may be a viable option in the eyes of the MPC it is not so in CISC areas which would witness a probable end to any sort of order. The ongoing Kalari peace process offers the only real option for sustainable peace, and is an essential precursor to any long-term ability to address the root causes of the conflict.
- The 8th Continent Regional Coalition (CRC) has played a significant role in moving the peace process forward and is increasingly optimistic that an agreement will be reached in the near future, key aspects of the agreement are likely to include:
  - Mechanisms for disengagement, implementation and monitoring of a ceasefire;
  - Confidence building measures, including the release of prisoners;
  - Respect for human rights;
  - The establishment of a Government of National Reconciliation;
  - Commitment to the longer-term establishment of a democratically elected government;
  - Disarmament of armed groups;
  - Restructured military and police forces.

## **Background and objective of the Strategic Assessment**

- United Nations Security Council PRST of 26 April 2015 confirmed the Council's readiness to consider active UN involvement to support the implementation of a ceasefire and a long-term political settlement.
- A Secretary-General's Planning Directive was issued on 26 April 2015.
- DPKO has assumed lead responsibility for planning and an Integrated Task Force (ITF) has been formed.
- The UN system must be prepared to act quickly and deploy an integrated mission as soon as the terms of a ceasefire agreement are confirmed. The conditions for such a deployment are generally good, but any delay will create an opportunity for disaffected groups to undermine the process, and result in a renewed cycle of violence with consequences both for the long-term political situation and the immediate humanitarian problem.
- The plan must synchronize immediate stabilization objectives within the overall framework of recovery, reconstruction and development, which is essential for long-term stability in Carana.

### **Aim**

To present to the SG options for deployment of a multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission in Carana the achievement of whose objectives will include:

- The provision of advice and assistance to a transitional government to enable it to:
  - Re-establish rule of law;
  - Address the demands of re-establishing the 1991 Constitution;
  - Prepare for elections on whatever timescale is established by a peace agreement;
  - Address the economic needs of Carana;
  - Restructure its future military and police forces;
  - Rectify the damage to the education system resulting from the conflict.
- A peacekeeping force with the capability:
  - To monitor the ceasefire, report violations and take appropriate action to prevent breaches;
  - To provide protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, including all forms of sexual and gender based violence;
  - To provide protection to UN personnel and facilities;

- To provide assistance in support of programmes to disarm armed groups;
  - To provide support to humanitarian assistance, which is defined as providing physical protection when necessary or requested, and ensuring that the general environment is conducive to conduct humanitarian assistance;
  - To plan to support an election process to include the provision of logistic assistance and security during registration, campaigning and voting.
- The provision of humanitarian assistance to address:
    - Immediate needs arising from shortages of food, shelter and basic commodities;
    - The needs of 200,000 IDP and refugees and to support their return;
    - The shortcomings in the provision of basic services such as medical care, water and sanitation;
    - Proper coordination and execution to ensure resources are appropriately utilized
  - The re-establishment of acceptable standards of human rights to include:
    - Recognition of individual rights;
    - Recognition of the rights of children;
    - Recognition of the rights of women.

## **Key Conflict Factors**

### **Political**

#### **Overview**

Despite the signing of the Kalari Treaty (Peace Agreement), Carana remains a politically unstable country. The government has little control over the western and the southern provinces of the country. Even in government-controlled areas, the Ogavo administration's real power is limited. An increasing level of public resistance is challenging the limited resources of the government's security forces. Governmental administration in the rebel-controlled areas is non-existent.

#### **Political Parties**

Carana is essentially a one-party state represented by the Parti Démocratique de Carana (PDC). Years of repression have destroyed any effective and legitimate

opposition, or have driven it underground; any legitimate opposition capability is so fragmented that it is unlikely to be politically viable for some time.

Those opposition groups that do exist tend to be relatively insignificant and on the fringe of political activity; this include some communist groups in the capital and Maldosa, as well as Kori ethnic minority groups on the coast. These groups are not organized and have little importance because of their narrow interest and small, following. Other groups having some political influence are the coal and copper miners' trade unions, which are mainly interest-based.

With an eye on future elections, the leadership of rebel group MPC is currently developing its political platform and preparing for a long-term political role. Given its ability to coordinate activities against the government, it could become an effective political force. It enjoys broad public support in the west through its ability to be seen to address the concerns and needs of the people when the government had failed.

In contrast the CISC lacks the structure or organization that would enable it to develop into an effective political body. It owes its following to frustration over poor living conditions, general dissatisfaction with the Ogavo administration and longstanding ethnic hostilities with the Falin minority in Leppko province. It has never made an attempt to capitalize on its potential nor articulated any clear political objectives. It may become increasingly frustrated when it sees itself marginalised.

Carana has no political diaspora or organized groups in exile.

### Elections

While the Kalari Treaty calls for elections within 12 months, the current unstable security situation could threaten the credibility and legitimacy of such an electoral process.

After years of human rights violations, despotism, civil war and corruption, the public trust in governmental institutions and activities is almost non-existent. Potential political opposition groups will be hard pressed to organize themselves in time to conduct an effective election campaign; this could result in calls to delay the elections, or attempts to subvert the electoral process itself. Nevertheless, the timeline for elections was a crucial element in the peace negotiations.

Another significant factor is the absence of an accurate census, the last national census having taken place in 1980. When combined with the large-scale displacement of the population voter registration will be a long, complex and costly exercise.

If all parties honour the commitments of the Kalari Treaty, it can be hoped that the MPC will participate in future elections and evolve into a legitimate political party. The long-term political role of the CISC is uncertain. A further uncertainty is the potential emergence of hitherto unidentified groups, who are not signatories to the Kalari Treaty,

either to join the political process or to oppose it. In either case this may cause political instability, leading to armed resistance and the ensuing security risks to the elections.

### **Government of National Reconciliation (GNR)**

The Kalari Treaty calls for the establishment of a Government of National Reconciliation pending the Presidential and national elections which will elect a new government.

Under the provisions for the treaty effective power will be in the hands of a consensus Prime Minister. Lucien Langata, or LL as he is known, was a member of the PDC and Finance Minister until he took a stand against corruption in the mid-90s. Narrowly escaping execution due to his popular following amongst the Falin, LL refused to leave Carana and President Ogavo has allowed him to live in relative obscurity. He is considered a popular and sensible choice for Prime Minister and enjoys sufficient support across the country to have a reasonable chance of pulling the GNR together.

While nominally still President, Ogavo has been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity and by the GNR for corruption. Unfortunately, he has disappeared and was last seen in Jumi in late May. He is believed to be still in Carana, protected by a group of hard line former members of the Presidential Guard, and could potentially disrupt the peace process since there is neither the will nor the capability within the former security forces to track him down.

### **DDR**

The requirement for all parties to the conflict to disarm is stated in the Kalari Treaty. It can be assumed that the MPC will honour this commitment if all parties adhere to the Treaty, especially in view of its political aspirations and its expectations for its fighters to be included within the restructured national armed forces.

Whilst there are no indications that CISC will not disarm in accordance with the Kalari Treaty, the lack of a proper organizational structure and the inherent lack of discipline within the various separate factions will make it a more difficult process. It is probable that some factions will see themselves being disadvantaged, leading to freelance military activity, which may be politically or criminally motivated. Many of these CISC soldiers have also been involved in systematic sexual violence against women, girls and young boys. It is therefore difficult to determine how the integration of the soldiers will be perceived by the population in the affected areas. In the CISC group, there is also a high percentage of women and girls who have been abducted and who now live with the soldiers. In effect, these women and girls also constitute the logistics and healthcare of the CISC military structure. A further complication is that these women are not welcome back into their original villages.

By extension, the most difficult part in the DDR process will be the disarmament and reintegration of any other armed groups who have no allegiance to any group, are not signatories of the Kalari Treaty and whose focus is largely criminal activities.

## **Constitution and Judicial System**

The Constitution and judicial system in Carana is based on modern democratic principles. Violations of human rights and other legal shortcomings stem from a systematic abuse and exploitation of the existing rules by the Ogava regime.

Under the “State of Emergency” (see below) a system of mixed civilian/military courts, with very limited rights of appeal, has been put in place to try all treason, terrorist and similar cases. Carana courts regularly impose the death penalty for serious crime.

A number of human rights organisations have issued reports outlining arrests, detentions and executions without due legal process. There are also reports of torture, including sexual abuse and rape, and uninvestigated deaths in the prisons. Many of the detainees are members of opposition political groups. Prison conditions generally give cause for concern. Official records of who is being held are impossible to obtain and the ICRC has limited access and only to the main prison in Galasi. There are reliable reports of children being detained with adults as well as men and women being held in the same facilities. Some of the women have their infants with them. In general, prisoners are treated harshly, conditions are inhumane, nutrition is inadequate and there is little or no medical assistance. No information is available regarding the identity of prisoners held in military holding facilities. The rebels are known to be holding many detainees.

## **Human Rights**

Carana has ratified the following human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of all Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention Against Torture. It has also ratified the Statute of the ICC.

The Constitution states that all laws must be consistent with Carana's international human rights obligations. It underlines that these rights should be upheld regardless of gender, ethnic group or creed. In reality, Carana legislation contains many laws inherited from the colonial period, which are incompatible with international human rights standards – for instance the Carana criminal procedure code. The Constitution also contains a Bill of Rights, which refers mostly to civil and political rights. It is silent as regards to other rights such as economic, social and cultural rights.



Currently, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the Carana government has declared a “State of Emergency” which permits it to override the constitutional provisions, including its human rights elements. In 2009, the UN Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Carana. The Special Rapporteur has visited the country on a number of occasions and has sharply criticized all parties to the conflict for human rights abuses perpetuated against civilians. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict has also visited and highlighted the disturbingly large number of children used in combat roles by rebel elements as well as by the national army.

The Carana Government does not have a human rights ministry – instead the lead responsibility for human rights is vested in the Minister of Justice. In 2005, the National Human Rights Commission was established. The commission is not compliant with the international standards for a national human rights institution as set out in the “Paris Principles”. Carana has a number of active human rights NGOs, including women’s and youth groups, whose freedom to operate has been inhibited by the fear of reprisals, but with the change in the situation they are becoming increasingly vociferous. A number of international humanitarian NGOs are also represented in the country.

### **Gender Specific Considerations: Women**

Carana holds 130<sup>th</sup> place in the Gender Development index ranking and has high mortality rates in childbirth and has low literacy rates for women. As many men are working in the mines or manufacturing industry as well as being forcefully recruited to the military organizations, women are largely left with responsibility for small-scale farming to support extended families. This distribution of labour, which leaves many women vulnerable to threats, has resulted in their increased political awareness.

In parliament, however, women represent only 8 % of members, which makes it difficult for their concerns to be heard. In public life women have held posts generally associated with assistance i.e. women’s affairs, health, etc. and have not been in decision-making positions. The only official women’s organization is the women’s wing of Parti Démocratique de Carana (PDC) which has advocated a return to traditional roles for women and men.

With the new political situation, women are mobilizing at the grass-root level. In the past, the State used abduction and rape to stigmatize, and undermine, female political involvement. The only women’s organizations that could operate addressed less overt political issues such as children’s issues (i.e. education, nutrition). However, there were women’s organizations in the conflict-affected areas helping victims of sexual violence. These women’s groups report high levels of domestic violence, including sexual abuse especially in the IDP camps.



Systematic sexual violence was used in some of the war-affected areas. The CISC is one of the main perpetrators of violence resulting from their poor command and control structures. The CDF and law enforcement agencies National Police are also responsible for sexual violence against civilians of the Kori and Tatzi ethnic groups. The conflict seems to have exacerbated the trafficking of women and children both internally and to neighboring countries. Trafficking of humans is related to the trafficking of weapons and drugs, all three of which have been used by the warring parties to continue the conflict.

### **Gender Specific Considerations: Men**

Given the high crime rates, a large number of young men are being killed in crime related violence such as riots or gang fights. Men's health is also negatively affected by the working conditions in the mines and manufacturing industry. Trade unions have not been able to address this situation effectively, partly because of their political involvement in the conflict. Sanitary conditions in the shanty towns where many men live are poor with high levels of alcoholism and drug addiction as well as HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases. In the southern and western areas affected by the war there is often forced recruitment of men, particularly the very young. As a result, many men are leaving the country with their families being left behind. Men involved in the political struggle can be subjected to violence with reports of sexual torture and rape being used against political prisoners. In the southern region, civilian men of the Falin are the main target of violence used mainly by the CISC. Similarly, civilian men of the Kori and Tatsi are targeted by the CDF in their campaigns.

### **The Situation with Regard to Girls and Boys**

The political conflict along with a deteriorating economy has had a grave impact on the young population, of which 44 % is under the age of 15. Both girls and boys leave school to help support their families. Forced genital mutilation of girls in their early teens, though illegal, is practiced extensively by the Kori. There has been extensive abuse of both boys and girls throughout the conflict. The CISC are the main culprits of abductions but also sections of the CDF have been reported to be responsible. This high degree of violence toward girls, boys and women has prompted public discussion about the need to fight violence against women in the society at large.

## **Security**

### **Overview**

The level of general security in Carana is low as a result of the intense fighting between government and rebel forces, the poor economic situation, the high number of displaced people, the low police presence outside of the capital and the widespread dissatisfaction with the government. Civil unrest is widespread and occur on a regular

basis. The level of crime is high. In general, the security situation in Carana must be assessed as “Medium Risk”. Some areas, such as the areas around Galasi, Akkabar and the Leppko province have to be assessed as “High Risk”. Male abductees of all ages are often coerced into the fighting forces and girls and women are used as what amounts as slaves, including being forced to become “wives” of combatants. These women are also at times forced to participate in outright fighting. If they refuse they are killed. Rape and other forms of sexual abuse are commonplace and are used to intimidate.

#### Galasi

In Galasi the primary risk is the high level of crime in the suburbs and IDP camps around the capital. In the suburbs of Galasi gangs of male youngsters, of up to 100 in number, rule the streets. These gangs pose a threat even to unwary military formations. They own no particular allegiance but are prepared to work for the highest bidder; as such they are something of a ‘wild card.’ Within the IDP camps there is a high level of petty crime, mostly as a result of poverty and hopelessness, but this has been on the decline recently since the appearance of vigilante groups who dispense their own form of summary justice.

#### Akkabar

In Akkabar the coal mine workers went on strike in May 2010 as they had not been paid for four months. These men live in shantytowns in poor conditions, separated from their families. What started as an industrial dispute soon escalated into open conflict after excess use of force by the police resulting in the death of several miners. In reaction, some miners have subsequently attacked a number of government institutions, particularly police stations, and banks. Activity is sporadic and often spontaneous but it has increasing local support.

#### Leppko

The breakdown of government authority in Leppko province has resulted in an increase in the number of uncontrolled armed groups that together with CISC combatants, have preyed on the local population. Many of these groups are former rebels from neighbouring Rimosa who have taken advantage of the unstable situation in Carana. Links between the CISC and these groups are denied by the CISC but several independent reports indicate such links exist. These groups are involved in the organised smuggling of weapons and drugs as well as the trafficking of women.

### **Military**

#### General Situation

Following the signing of the Kalari Treaty the combatants have generally remained where they were, unwilling to concede any gains made, and each fearful that the other side might renege on its commitments. This has resulted in an unstable stalemate in a

number of areas and, while no violations of the ceasefire have been reported, the close proximity of opposing forces poses a significant risk that will increase the longer it is allowed to continue. Therefore disengagement, separation and a start to the disarmament process are high priorities.

### **Carana Defence Force (CDF)**

CDF remained in their positions after the ceasefire. Four infantry battalions remained deployed along the separation line between CDF and MPC, and an additional three deployed in the South around the area claimed by CISC. The Airborne Battalion, in conjunction with Gendarmerie units, is deployed in the city of Maroni to handle the riots of the coal miners. The engineer units and the Reconnaissance Company are co-located in the north west with the Infantry Units. The location of the Artillery Battalion and the Air Defence Units is unknown.

The five Alpha Jets of the Carana Air Force can be assessed as non-operational. The helicopters have been used frequently for air patrols.

According to our own observations, the logistic situation for the CDF appears poor. Spare parts seem to be a particular problem.

The CDF has been alleged of not respecting international humanitarian law, with reported cases of sexual violence. This is primarily true of the CDF positioned in the South.

### **MPC**

Original assessment of the MPC strength was somewhat conservative and has been adjusted from a total of 6000 to approximately 10,000. Approximately 5000 MPC returned home last month but most have kept their weapons and remain ready to return to their formations if necessary. It is assessed that the remaining 5000 MPC rebels are sufficient to balance the presence of the CDF on the separation line and maintain the status quo, especially when backed up by the knowledge that they can quickly be reinforced. It is assessed that the underlying reason for this redeployment is to ensure that the front line MPC troops are logistically sustainable, and they certainly appear better prepared than many of their CDF counterparts.

The deployed elements of the MPC have established camps of up to approximately 250 mainly male soldiers (including their families and dependents) from whence they conduct patrols west of the separation line. While this is not in contravention of the Kalari Treaty it has the potential to act as a trigger for other action whether by mistake or by design.

After the end of fighting, the official HQ in Alur increased its importance and became a basic administrative centre of the region. Some leaders of MPC are permanently in Alur.

The MPC operates a harsh public order regime but has repeatedly indicated that they respect human rights, especially the rights of the child. As a result of broad public support, and dissatisfaction with the government, the new administrative role of the MPC is increasingly accepted by the population in the West.

## **CISC**

During the fighting, CISC fighters operated primarily from their villages without deploying in camps or permanent positions. After the fighting stopped, it can be assumed that most CISC rebels are living in their home villages and group only occasionally.

The loose structure of CISC makes it very difficult to assess their strength and positions precisely. It can be assumed that their number has not changed and remains in the region of 2000-3000 of active male fighters.

Hitherto the CISC has focused its attention on the CDF and has relied upon the strong anti-government feelings in the south for most of its support. However, recently there have been reports of several acts of violence against ethnic minorities in the south of the area adjacent to the border with Rimosa. It is not clear whether members of the CISC have been involved, which would be in violation of the Kalari Treaty, or whether these acts are the responsibility of other splinter groups that are not signatories. In any case, civilian Falin are likely to be a target as a way to get at the Government.

Unlike the MPC, the CISC has not tried to establish administrative functions or exercise control in the region except by the use of force. They are notably brutal in combat and show no regard for the rights of non-combatants.

## **Police**

The concept of conventional policing is almost non-existent. In government controlled areas the police, both National Police and Gendarmerie, are seen as a means of enforcing government policy and protecting government interests. In the remainder of the country the police are targeted as they are so closely identified with the repressive regime. Consequently, many have been killed, and others have either fled or changed allegiance. As a result, law and order is either maintained, or not, by the dominant group in any given area. In some areas, such as those in which the MPC has asserted control, a quasi-capacity to maintain law and order exists. In others, mainly in the south, there is none at all. Certain crimes – such as domestic violence or Gender Based Violence – are not addressed at all by the police. Reporting sexual violence to the police entails the risk of renewed attack by the police itself, as the victim is sometimes considered as guilty as the perpetrator.

Where police do exist they are poorly paid, or not paid at all, with the result that corruption remains endemic; police stations have little equipment and that which they do have is of military origin and entirely unsuitable for a democratic police force. Police

training has virtually ceased. To compound the problem the existing police structure is so identified with President Ogavo that no member of it would be accepted in the MPC or ICSC controlled areas.

## **Economy**

Prior to the civil war, the Caranian economy was already suffering from decade-long negative growth due to excessive governmental control, corruption and a lack of efficient public administration. It continued to deteriorate during the war which brought the production of copper to a halt and saw much of the diamond production hijacked by a number of groups. The flow of foreign currency reduced to a trickle, and what did exist was mostly used to buy weapons or was misappropriated. Fighting in rural areas meant that the timber industry was reduced to approximately 20% of its pre-conflict capacity and agricultural production fell to approximately 40-50%. The net result has been an inflation rate that has been running somewhere around 300% and a significantly reduced supply of basic commodities. The warfare in the countryside has also affected the small-scale farming used to support many women who are heads-of-household. This concerns widows as well as wives of men who are working in the mines or the manufacturing industry.

The result is an increasingly dire humanitarian situation, which has only been prevented from becoming a major crisis by external aid and reliance on a subsistence economy. Inevitably the consequences are most acute in the major towns where increasing social dissatisfaction frequently erupts into violence.

## **Infrastructure**

### **Roads**

Carana has an adequate road network with paved routes connecting most parts of the country, and key urban centres. In the west and the north, these roads also link to the networks in neighboring Katasi and Sumora. A few paved roads can withstand the effects of the monsoon season, but the majority are in need of significant maintenance. Carana has also a comprehensive network of secondary (unpaved) roads and tracks, which often become impassable during the rainy season.

Bridges along the paved roads are normally steel and concrete constructions, which can carry trucks and heavy vehicles up to approx. 20 tons. Those along the unpaved roads are normally of wooden construction and need to be assessed individually before they can be used by UN traffic.

### **Railways**

The two railway tracks running between Galasi and Akkabar, and between Maldosa and Mia are both operational but degraded. Currently the Galasi to Akkabar line can go no further than Maroni as the main railway bridge was destroyed by flooding in 2004 and is yet to be repaired.

There are rail yards at Galasi, Maroni, Akkabar and Maldosa capable of handling containers, vehicles and other goods. The station in Mia is specialized for the transport of copper and has no freight handling facilities.

In common with the road network there has been little or no maintenance over the past few years, consequently the tracks are deteriorating and are likely to be subject to increasing restrictions both in terms of speed and capacity.

## Harbours

In Carana there are three deep-water harbours, and a number of smaller fishing ports. The smaller harbours have no capacity to support the loading and unloading of ships, but they are suitable for coastal vessels.

The main harbour in Galasi is well equipped, can handle large ships and has a RoRo and container capability. This harbour will not cause any limitations for deployment and support of a potential UN Mission.

The harbour in Cereni has no RoRo or significant container capability but is equipped with operational cranes and can take break-bulk ships up to approximately 600 ft in length. However, there is only limited dock space without disrupting regular trade; this effectively limits capacity to no more than two ships over and above the routine shipping.

The harbour in Maldosa is geared to specialized handling for the export of copper but has a similar capacity to Cereni for the handling of regular transport ships. Only two wharves are equipped with cranes which will limit capacity, and there is very limited parking or storage space due to the harbour being in the town; this being said there is ample space on the western outskirts.

## Airports

The international airports in Galasi and Corma are both operational and meet international standards for air traffic. Both airports have runways suitable for heavy transport aircraft.

- The airport in Galasi is well equipped for handling heavy material and has ample ramp space in excess of its routine requirements. Space for storing equipment and assembling vehicles in close proximity to the airport is limited, but generally it meets most requirements for the deployment of personnel and

equipment.

- Limitations on ramp space and cargo handling capacity restrict the capacity of the airport at Corma, however it has almost unlimited space close to the airport for storage / parking, and there are no significant limitations to the deployment of personnel.

The airstrips in Alur and Folsa are suitable for medium transport aircraft but they do not have equipment to handle heavy air cargo.

All other airstrips are only suitable for light fixed wing aircraft without additional construction work. They can be used for communication and small size personnel transport.

Fuel supplies are only available in Galasi and Corma.

<b>Airport</b>	<b>Paved Runway</b>	<b>Runway leng</b>	<b>Paved Apron (Sqm)</b>	<b>Instrument Approach System</b>	<b>Loading Equipment</b>
Galasi	Yes	3200 m	40 000	Yes	Yes
Corma	Yes	2700 m	10 000	Yes	Yes
Alur	Yes	1500 m	-	No	No
Folsa	Yes	1200 m	-	No	No
Amsan	Yes	1200 m	-	No	No
Mia	No	1100 m	-	No	No

## Electricity

There are three power plants, the Kilu Dam, the Salobo Dam and a coal power plant in Galasi. In recent years, Carana was a net exporter of electricity during and after the rainy season. During the fighting most of the power supply equipment around the Salobo Dam was destroyed or damaged. The instability in the Hanno area, caused by the miners' unrest, has led to a shortage of coal and has limited the production of electricity.

Since the power supply system is not designed as a network with redundancies, but organized on a region oriented star pattern, the damage of one main line can cut supply to a large area. Accordingly, most of the country is currently without regular power supply.

## Water

Potable water is available in most parts of the country but the quality of water varies. In the more arid areas south west of Maldosa and west of Galasi drinking water is drawn mostly from small ponds and slow flowing brooks and is of poor quality and a source of



various water borne diseases. Daily collection of water is time-consuming and onerous, particularly for women. The drinking water close to the coal and copper mining areas is highly polluted, causing health problems for the men living in the surrounding shantytowns. These poor hygienic conditions are connected with a high infant mortality rate. Near the major rivers there is ample water supply but it still needs purification.

## **Humanitarian**

### **Refugees and IDPs**

The refugee and IDP situation remains unchanged for the information provided in the UN Country Team Report. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are mainly women and their children and they mostly headed east to the capital and other coastal cities, where most are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns in, or near, urban areas. The crime rate— such as murder, rape, domestic violence and theft – is high in the camps. The situation concerning health and sanitation is poor.

There is also fear among the refugee/IDP women that the already agreed DDR process will lead to the reintegration into their villages or areas of the men who sexually abused them.

### **Nutrition**

As a consequence of the economic crisis and the war, the price of food and basic goods increased dramatically. Though all basic goods are available, large parts of the population cannot afford sufficient nutrition. The child mortality rate has dramatically increased during the last years.

The most affected areas are the north of Hanno, the area between Faron and Folsa and the coastal area south of Cereni where the situation has already reached a crisis.

### **Landmines**

During the conflict between CDF and rebels, landmines were used intensively by all parties, yet the nature of the conflict and the forces involved meant that very little documentation was maintained. Consequently mines pose a major and unpredictable threat to the population at large, aid agencies and any potential peacekeeping mission. There is an immediate need to identify the areas of highest risk, many of which are in the west of the country, and begin action to reduce the threat.

### **Analysis of priority objectives**

Conflict factor	Priority objective
Unequal participation in political representation or access to power	Support an inclusive form of government as a key component of a negotiated settlement
Militarization of politics perpetuating violent conflict and impedes peaceful resolution of disputes	Establish a comprehensive process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups following a ceasefire, including community work and social cohesion activities to ensure social reintegration
High level of impunity for sexual violence being used as a tactic of warfare or as a means of destabilizing communities	Develop security and justice sector strategies to prevent and respond to sexual violence, as well as to contribute to behaviour change (personal, institutional)
Political and social inequality in access to economic and social rights	Establish an inclusive system of government; provide population with equal access to services and entitlements
Massive population displacement preventing economic recovery and creating new causes of conflict	(Re)integration in secure and durably stable areas of return and/or relocation
Weak civil society leading to lack of progress in local reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts	Support the strengthening of civil society in conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts
Unaccountable judicial system perpetuating discrimination against minorities and fueling conflict	Support reform of judicial system to ensure equal access to justice and contribution to national reconciliation processes
Police corruption fueling grievances and conflict	Address police corruption as part of security and justice sector reform

## **Existing capacities and an analysis of risks and opportunities**

### **The UN Country Team and Non-governmental Organizations in Carana**

Despite the troubles in Carana, the United Nations has maintained a presence in the country through several relief and development agencies. Additionally, a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operate in Carana. In many cases, these agencies and organizations have been on the ground working in Carana for at least 5-10 years.

#### **The UN Country Team in Carana consists of the following organizations:**

- **World Food Program (WFP)**

Responsible for food distribution programmes and maintains offices in Galasi, Amsan, Corma, Folsa and Alur.

- **United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**

The lead agency for programmes helping children; it has offices in Galasi, Folsa and Corma.

- **The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**

Protects and assists refugees; it has offices in Galasi, Alur and Lora.

- **The World Health Organization (WHO)**

Coordinates international health programmes; it has an office in Galasi.

- **The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)**

A small team based in Galasi, who are responsible for monitoring and reporting on human rights issues throughout the country.

- **United Nations Development Program (UNDP)**

Responsible for UN development activities. The UNDP Resident Representative is also the UN Resident Coordinator and chairs weekly UN country team meetings in Galasi, attended by the heads of all the agencies above.

#### **Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)**

A total of twelve international and eighteen local NGOs operate throughout Carana, providing services in various sectors including food, health, water, hygiene, sanitation, refugee and IDP issues, children's issues and women's issues. Additionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (ICRC), mandated to assist victims of war, is present in Galasi, Amsan, Alur and Kika.

## **Public Information**

In Carana, radio, TV and the major newspapers are controlled by the government. They are more an instrument of propaganda, than a free source of information. International newspapers are only available in Galasi. National newspapers are available in the provincial capitals and in some other towns. For the past several months, the MPC has produced a regional newspaper and operates one radio station.

As a result of the war several radio and TV transmission stations were destroyed, leaving large areas without access to TV and radio programmes.

## **Education**

Prior to the civil war, Carana had one of the best developed education systems in the region from primary to tertiary levels. The effects of war and a declining economy have seriously degraded the system, reducing the overall number of schools, particularly at the primary level, and resulting in a general decline in the number of students across the board. The decrease in the number of female students is particularly notable, and is largely attributed to the risk of violence against them.

## **Support**

### **Availability of Goods and Services**

Notwithstanding the poor economic situation in Carana, most basic goods and supplies are still available, although both quality and availability can be erratic. Local purchase to meet UN mission requirements is therefore uncertain.

Fuel, construction material and food can be purchased, or contracted, in country although the rampant inflation rate and the potential of a UN deployment is already leading to escalating prices.

Fuel and rations can be purchased in Galasi, Cereni, and Maldosa from international contractors.

There is an ample supply of timber which can be purchased from local dealers in the larger towns, but concrete and steel are only available in Galasi, Maroni, Corma and Maldosa. Basic construction work can be contracted in all larger towns.

Specialised construction materials such as plumbing parts, windows or doors are hard to get on the local market. In addition, furniture of adequate quality is largely unavailable.

Technical goods such as IT equipment, vehicles and spares are generally unavailable in country.

Transport services can be contracted in the Galasi, Cereni and Maldosa although a series of truck driver strikes during the last year has meant that service has become unpredictable.

There are no vehicle or aircraft rental companies currently in Carana.

### **Local Labour**

Given the increased levels of unemployment following the war, there is no shortage of unskilled, or semi-skilled labour. Availability of skilled labour has reduced as many professional people left the country during the war. In the former two categories only approximately 30% have any English, the remainder uses either French or local dialects.

### **Banking**

The banking system is only operational in Galasi, Cereni and Maldosa and it does not support electronic cash transfer in any location. In some provincial capitals and in some other towns, rudimentary banking functions do exist but these are of little practical significance.

### **Availability of Real Estate**

In all towns over 50,000 inhabitants, office and accommodation is available for rent, although much is sub-standard and suffering from a lack of basic maintenance and facilities, particularly water, sanitation and power.

### **Strategic options for United Nations engagement**

(Each Option also gives details of military, police and civil components)

Option 1. The DSRSG and RC function are brought together but the HC function remains separate

Option 2. The DSRSG, RC and HC functions are brought together but the offices remain separate:

The RC and OCHA offices (supporting the RC and HC functions, respectively) are either co-located with the DSRSG office or physically separated, depending on

a range of factors including security and perception issues (OCHA offices are located separately in most current missions with DSRSG/RC/HCs).

Option 3. The DSRSG, RC and HC functions are brought together, supported by an integrated DSRSG/RC office established to support the DSRSG and RC functions, with an OCHA supporting the HC function.

Option 4. The SRSG, RC and HC functions are brought together, under the title of ERSG (Executive Representative of the Secretary General)